David K. Levine

David K. Levine
Born	David Knudsen Levine c. 1955 (age 60–61)
Nationality	American

Institution	Washington University in St. Louis
Field	Game theory, General equilibrium Theory
Alma mater	UCLA, MIT
Contributions	Learning in games, Folk theorem

David Knudsen Levine (born c. 1955) is the John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor of Economics at Washington University in St. Louis. His research includes the study of intellectual property and endogenous growth in dynamic general equilibrium models, the endogenous formation of preferences, social norms and institutions, learning in games, and game theory applications to experimental economics.

Biography

At UCLA, Levine obtained a B.A. in Mathematics in 1977, and an M.A. in Economics in the same year. He was awarded a Ph.D. in Economics at MIT in June 1981. He became an Assistant Professor of Economics at UCLA in July 1981, an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Minnesota in 1987, and a Professor of Economics at UCLA in the same year. In 1997 he became the Armen Alchian Professor of Economics at UCLA. In 2006 he moved to Washington University in St. Louis, where he became the John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor of Economics.

Levine was the Coeditor of the Review of Economic Dynamics from November 1996 to June 2001, and of Econometrica from July 2003 to June 2008. He presided the Society for Economic Dynamics from July 2006 to June 2009.

Levine is a Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1989 and a Research Associate at NBER since 2006.

Research

David K. Levine conducts ongoing research in general equilibrium theory, focusing specifically on growth theory, innovation, and intellectual property. Collaborating with Michele Boldrin, Levine examines the role of increasing returns in growth and innovation. They posit that little evidence exists for increasing returns at the aggregate level, and thus argue that there is no reason to believe that increasing returns play an important role in growth. This theory concludes that existing claims for the necessity of intellectual property in the process of growth and innovation are greatly exaggerated.

Levine also conducts research in the field of dynamic games. He established with Drew Fudenberg that a long-lived player playing in opposition to short-lived players can substitute reputation for commitment. He developed with Eric Maskin the first "folk theorem" for games in which players do not directly observe each other's decisions, with applications for learning in games. They argued that while learning theories cannot provide detailed descriptions of non-equilibrium behavior, they act as a useful tool in understanding which equilibria are likely to emerge. One example of this, they put forward, explains how superstitions survive in the face of rational learning.

Levine currently studies the endogenous formation of preferences and social norms. His analysis of experimental anomalies explores some of the limitations of the standard economic model of self-interested individuals.

Publications

The Theory of Learning in Games, co-author with Drew Fudenberg
Against Intellectual Monopoly, co-author with Michele Boldrin

Working papers

http://www.dklevine.com/papers.htm

Podcast

http://www.dklevine.com/podcasts.xml

External links

Economic and Game Theory, by David K. Levine
Against Monopoly: Defending the Right to Innovate
Freshmeat account, author of cross-platform UNIX software
Copyright Controversies: Freedom, Property, Content Creation, and the DMCA, a Cato Institute conference at which Levine spoke.
Against Intellectual Property lecture, a recording of a free public lecture by David Levine at Simon Fraser University.
Levine's academic CV

Topics in game theory

Definitions	Normal-form game Extensive-form game Escalation of commitment Graphical game Cooperative game Succinct game Information set Hierarchy of beliefs Preference

Equilibrium concepts	Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Mertens-stable equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Trembling hand Proper equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Correlated equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Risk dominance Core Shapley value Pareto efficiency Gibbs equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Strong Nash equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium

Strategies	Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Tit for tat Grim trigger Collusion Backward induction Forward induction Markov strategy

Classes of games	Symmetric game Perfect information Simultaneous game Sequential game Repeated game Signaling game Screening game Cheap talk Zero-sum game Mechanism design Bargaining problem Stochastic game n-player game Large Poisson game Nontransitive game Global games Strictly determined game Potential game

Games	Prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock-paper-scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto games War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Prisoners and hats puzzle Trust game Princess and monster game Monty Hall problem Rendezvous problem

Theorems	Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Purification theorem Folk theorem Revelation principle Arrow's impossibility theorem

Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Ariel Rubinstein Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Thomas Schelling William Vickrey

See also	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

Authority control	WorldCat Identities VIAF: 88059465 LCCN: n89640853 ISNI: 0000 0001 0859 0760 SUDOC: 033954976 BNF: cb12475926z (data) MGP: 207499

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