Difference feminism

Taking for granted an equal moral status as persons, difference feminism asserts that there are differences between men and women that are not or should not be considered equally.

The term "difference feminism" developed during the "equality-versus-difference debate" in American feminism in the 1980s and 1990s,[1] but subsequently fell out of favor and use. In the 1990s feminists addressed the binary logic of "difference" versus "equality" and moved on from it, notably with postmodern and/or deconstructionist approaches that either dismantled or did not depend on that dichotomy [2] [3][4]

Difference feminism did not require a commitment to essentialism. Most strains of difference feminism did not argue that there was a biological, inherent, ahistorical, or otherwise "essential" link between womanhood and traditionally feminine values, habits of mind (often called "ways of knowing"[5]), or personality traits.[6] These feminists simply sought to recognize that, in the present, women and men are significantly different and to explore the devalued "feminine" characteristics.[7]

Some strains of difference feminism, for example Mary Daly's, argue not just that women and men were different, and had different values or different ways of knowing, but that women and their values were superior to men's.[8] This viewpoint does not require essentialism, although there is ongoing debate about whether Daly's feminism is essentialist.[9][10]

History

Difference feminism was developed by feminists in the 1980s, in part as a reaction to popular liberal feminism (also known as "equality feminism"), which emphasized the similarities between women and men in order to argue for equal treatment for women. Difference feminism, although it still aimed at equality between men and women, emphasized the differences between men and women and argued that identicality or sameness are not necessary in order for men and women, and masculine and feminine values, to be treated equally.[11] Liberal feminism aimed to make society and law gender-neutral, since it saw recognition of gender difference as a barrier to rights and participation within liberal democracy, while difference feminism held that gender-neutrality harmed women "whether by impelling them to imitate men, by depriving society of their distinctive contributions, or by letting them participate in society only on terms that favor men.” [12]

Difference feminism drew on earlier nineteenth-century strains of thought, for example the work of German writer Elise Oelsner, which held that not only should women be allowed into formerly male-only spheres and institutions (e.g. public life, science) but that those institutions should also be expected to change in a way that recognizes the value of traditionally devalued feminine ethics (like care [see ethics of care]). On the latter point, many feminists have re-read the phrase "difference feminism" in a way that asks "what difference does feminism make?" (e.g. to the practice of science) rather than "what differences are there between men and women"?[13]

Reverse gender polarity

"Reverse gender polarity" is a term in the Roman Catholic social tradition, particularly the work of Sr. Prudence Allen on humanism and the Reformation,[14] which labels theories of gender that propose that women are intrinsically superior to men. These theories are understood by Allen to have developed as the opposite of traditional gender polarity, which asserts that men are intrinsically superior to women. The traditional polarity, also known as "patriarchy" or "sexism" in feminist thought, was espoused as early as Aristotle[15] and is claimed to run through the Judeo-Christian tradition[16][17][18] as well as the Western scientific tradition.[19]

Reverse gender polarity, however, has roots in the medieval era with chivalry, courtly love, and the exaltation of feminine virtue by authors like Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa and Lucrezia Marinelli.[20] Some have argued that the thought of certain prominent second-wave feminists, like psychologist Carol Gilligan and radical feminist theologian Mary Daly, argue for something like "reverse gender polarity," which in this case would mean that not only do these feminist thinkers believe that women are superior to men, but that "women" and "men" have fixed essences that cannot be changed. However, essentialist interpretations of Daly and Gilligan have been questioned by feminist scholars, who argue that charges of "essentialism" are often used more as terms of abuse than as theoretical critiques based on evidence,[21][22] and do not accurately reflect Gilligan[23] or Daly's[24] views.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Scott, Joan (1988). "Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Post-structuralist Theory for Feminism". Feminist Studies. 14 (1): 32. doi:10.2307/3177997.
  2. ↑ Scott, Joan (1988). "Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Post-structuralist Theory for Feminism". Feminist Studies. 14 (1): 32. doi:10.2307/3177997.
  3. ↑ Bock, Gisela; James, Susan (1992). Beyond Equality and Difference. Routledge.
  4. ↑ Voet, Rian (1998). Feminism anCitizenship. SAGE Publications Ltd.
  5. ↑ Schiebinger, Londa. Has Feminism Changed Science?. p. 8.
  6. ↑ Grande Jensen, Pamela. Finding a New Feminism: Rethinking the Woman Question for Liberal Democracy. p. 2 footnote 4.
  7. ↑ Tandon, Neeru. Feminism: A Paradigm Shift. p. 68.
  8. ↑ Tandon, Neeru. Feminism: A Paradigm Shift. p. 68.
  9. ↑ Hoagland, Sarah Lucia; Frye, Marilyn. "Feminist Interpretations of Mary Daly".
  10. ↑ Sandilands, Catriona (1999). The Good-Natured Feminist Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy. pp. chapter 5: "Cyborgs and Queers".
  11. ↑ Voet, Rian (1998). Feminism and Citizenship. SAGE Publications Ltd.
  12. ↑ Grande Jensen, Pamela. Finding a New Feminism: Rethinking the Woman Question for Liberal Democracy. p. 3.
  13. ↑ Schiebinger, Londa. Has Feminism Changed Science?. p. 8.
  14. ↑ Allen, Prudence. The Concept of Woman: The Early Humanist Reformation, 1250-1500, Part 1. p. 17.
  15. ↑ Allen, Prudence (2002). The Concept of Woman. William B Eerdmans Publishing. pp. 89–126. ISBN 978-0-8028-4735-5.
  16. ↑ Rosser, Sue Vilhauer. Women, Science, and Myth: Gender Beliefs from Antiquity to the Present. p. 203.
  17. ↑ Money, John; Wolman, Benjamin. Handbook of Human Sexuality. p. 228.
  18. ↑ Fox, Vivian C. (2002). Historical Perspectives on Violence Against Women. Journal of International Women's Studies. pp. 15–34.
  19. ↑ Rosser, Sue Vilhauer. Women, Science, and Myth: Gender Beliefs from Antiquity to the Present. p. vii-xvi.
  20. ↑ Allen, "Man-Woman Complementarity", p.3
  21. ↑ Heyes, Cressida J. (1997). "Anti-Essentialism in Practice: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Philosophy". Hypatia. 13 (3): 142–163. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.1997.tb00009.x.
  22. ↑ Braidotti, Rosi (1992). "Essentialism" in Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary.
  23. ↑ Heyes, Cressida J. (1997). "Anti-Essentialism in Practice: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Philosophy". Hypatia. 13 (3): 142–163. doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.1997.tb00009.x.
  24. ↑ Suhonen, Marja (2000). "Toward Biophilic Be-ing: Mary Daly's Feminist Metaethics and the Question of Essentalism" in Feminist Interpretations of Mary Daly. Penn State University Press. p. 112.
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