Operation Instant Thunder

United States Air Force planes flying over burning Kuwaiti oil wells

Operation Instant Thunder was the preliminary name given to a planned air strike by the United States during the Gulf War.[1] Designed by Colonel John A. Warden III, it was planned to be an overwhelming strike which would devastate the Iraqi military with a minimum loss of civilian as well as American life.[2][3]

The planning of the operation made use of Warden's Five Rings intellectual model.[3] The five rings, developed by Colonel John Warden of the United States Air Force, prioritized different aspects of a nations war machine into a bulls-eye type model. The leadership was placed as a top priority, saying that this would "decapitate" the enemy. The name is a nod to Operation Rolling Thunder, a joint American-South Vietnamese bombing campaign in the Vietnam War.[4]

Phase one

The plan called for three separate phases. The shortest of these was the first phase, which would use "defense suppression" to establish control of the air space above Iraq and Kuwait. This was to be accomplished by eliminating enemy radar, cutting off runways used by the Iraqi military and neutralizing any surface-to-air missile batteries.

This first phase of the operation would also include the bombing of selected military command posts as well as suspected locations of chemical weapons. A total of 84 targets were initially identified but this number was later increased.[5]

Coalition forces made extensive use of SEAD during the Persian Gulf War against Iraq in order to counter its – on paper at least – formidable IADS. By 1990 Iraq was protected by approximately 3,700 SAMs, organized into 105 firing batteries, and approximately 7,000 AAA pieces, supported by hundreds of overlapping early warning, search and acquisition radars. In the air the Iraq Air Force was the sixth largest in the world, including hundreds of interceptors which were housed and protected within hardened bunkers. At the center of the Iraqi IADS was Kari, an automated C2 system developed by Iraq and built by French contractors in the wake of Operation Opera (Kari in turn is the French spelling of Iraq backwards). Kari tied the entire IADS to a single location, the national Air Defense Operations Center located in an underground bunker in Baghdad, and in turn divided the country into four defense sectors each overseen by a Sector Operations Center (SOC) located at H-3, Kirkuk, Taji and Talil; a fifth SOC was added at Ali Al Salem to cover the recently conquered Kuwait. Each SOC oversaw the local airspace and commanded anywhere from two to five Intercept Operations Centers (IOCs) per sector. The IOCs were located in bunkers constructed at Iraqi Air Force bases and tied into local radar systems, whose information they could pass on to their SOC and thence on to Baghdad. In this way a SOC was capable of simultaneously tracking 120 aircraft and selecting for the appropriate weapon system to engage them. The SOC could automatically target for SA-2 and SA-3 SAM systems in their sector, which meant the SAMs did not have to turn on their own radar and reveal their position, or an IOC could direct local interceptors to engage the targets. Baghdad itself was one of the most heavily defended cities in the world—more heavily defended several times over than Hanoi during the Vietnam War-protected by 65% of Iraq's SAMs and over half of its AAA guns.[6][7]

An Iraqi radar site destroyed by the French 6th Light Armoured Division during Operation Desert Storm.

However, the Iraqi IADS had several fatal flaws of which Coalition air forces were able to take advantage. The system was primarily oriented towards defending against much smaller attacks from Iraq's most likely enemies – Iran, Syria and Israel – and focused on point defense rather than area defense. This meant there were significant gaps in its coverage, particularly on the orientation from Saudi Arabia straight to Baghdad, and attacking aircraft would be able to approach their target from multiple directions. Much of the Iraqi air defense equipment was also quite outdated: Iraqi SA-2 and SA-3 systems were nearing the end of their operational lifespan and their countermeasures well-known at this point, while what SA-6, SA-8 and Roland systems they possessed weren't much younger either. Likewise a majority of Iraq's interceptor force were less-capable MiG-21s, with fewer more modern variants including export versions of the MiG-29 and F1 Mirage. Furthermore, the IADS was centralized to a fault. Although each IOC was datalinked to their respective SOC and in turn back to the ADOC, the defense sectors couldn't share information between each other. If a SOC was knocked out of action the attached air defense weapons lost all ability to coordinate their response; its respective SAM batteries would be forced to rely on their own radar systems while most AAA guns lacked any radar guidance. Training was also poor, with Iraqi pilots overly reliant on ground-control instructions such that if the IOCs were disabled they lost situation awareness and became easy targets.[6][7]

A destroyed Iraqi SA-2 launcher during Operation Desert Storm.

Suppression of the Iraqi IADS played a prominent role in Operation Instant Thunder, the preliminary air campaign plan against Iraq which served as the basis for Operation Desert Storm's air campaign. In its initial limited form, Instant Thunder called for three dedicated SEAD squadrons which would significantly degrade the IADS enough to allow decimating strikes against Iraq's military and political leadership and other strategic targets.[8] This role for SEAD was further expanded as the mission grew in scope, involving a larger number of aircraft to completely destroy the air defenses protecting southern Iraq and Kuwait.[9] Planning for this mission was helped when the CIA contacted the French engineer responsible for designing the Kari IADS and passed along information about its vulnerabilities and limitations.[10] In its final form, Phase II of the Desert Storm air campaign sought to decimate the southern Iraqi IADS within two days of the start of hostilities. F-4G Wild Weasels and other aircraft capable of carrying HARM missiles would destroy air defense sites themselves, electronic warfare aircraft would disrupt radars and other systems, and additional targets would be struck in order to support this mission, such as temporarily knocking out Iraq's electrical infrastructure.[10][11] In addition to traditional SEAD systems the Persian Gulf War would also see the use of unconventional assets in knocking out Iraq's air defenses, in particular cruise missiles and F-117A Nighthawks, which would be used to attack sensitive targets.[12]

The opening shots of the Persian Gulf War were fired on January 17 in pursuit of defense-suppression: at 2:20AM local time Task Force Normandy, a group of twelve American helicopters, infiltrated into Iraq with the goal of destroying two early-warning radar sites. Three MH-53J Pave Lows guided nine AH-64 Apaches to the targets, which the gunships destroyed, opening a hole in the Iraqi IADS for the initial wave of aircraft to exploit. Two F-117As knocked out the Nukhayb IOC, further widening the gap, although their next attack against the H-3 SOC was unsuccessful. Among the first targets hit by F-117As attacking into Baghdad, bombs damaged the Al Taqaddum IOC and Talil SOC, shortly followed by Tomahawk strikes that disabled the electrical grid upon which Kari depended; reportedly some used special warheads filled with carbon fiber bundles to short-circuit the network. For the next several hours dozens of Coalition aircraft poured into Iraq. Those which weren't specifically directed to suppress air defenses had significant SEAD escort, including the use of BQM-74 drones and ADM-141 TALD decoys which would both "take the hit" for the manned airplanes and cause the Iraqis to reveal their position when they tracked or fired upon the lure. The first night's largest sortie was a joint US Air Force-Navy SEAD mission consisting of fifty aircraft designed to look like a bombing raid on Baghdad but which instead were fitted out with decoys, drones and HARMs to destroy air defenses protecting the city. With Kari degraded due to the disabling of the civilian electrical grid the Iraqi SAMs were forced to use their organic radar, producing what one pilot called "HARM Heaven". A total of 67 HARMs were fired over the course of twenty minutes, causing a significant reduction in Iraqi air defenses around the capital based on follow-up missions.[13]

Throughout the rest of the first night additional air-defense targets were hit by Coalition aircraft with varying levels of success while strikes against other targets consisted of a high ratio of SEAD and escort to strike aircraft. This pace of attack against air-defense and other targets continued into the first day, involving a variety of different aircraft, and spread to targets in Kuwait. A-10 Thunderbolt IIs were used to attack early-warning radars and similar sites along the border in operations known humorously as "Wart Weaseling" (a play on the Wild Weasel and the A-10 "Warthog" nicknames).[14]

Phase two

The second phase would attempt to incapacitate the Iraqi military, as well as the country's infrastructure. This would include the bombing of weapon depots, refineries and other locations critical to the success of the military. These strikes would cripple the Iraqi military by rendering Iraq unable to manufacture or repair weaponry.

Attention would then turn to disabling the civil infrastructure of Iraq, by destroying power plants, telephone lines and water treatment plants.

Phase three

Finally, the third phase would have seen the Americans engage the Iraqis in direct combat. Weakened by the initial stages, it was predicted that the Iraqi military would not be able to muster much resistance.

Implementation

Operation Instant Thunder planning started August 5, 1990. By the time fighting began on January 17, 1991, the three phases were consolidated into Operation Desert Storm, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was reluctant to support any action which did not include a ground offensive.[2]

The tactics used by the American military during the operation would serve as a model for future conflicts in which the United States was involved.[15]

Notes

  1. ↑ Jaco, Charles (2002). The Complete Idiot's Guide to the Gulf War. Alpha Books. p. 106. ISBN 0-02-864324-0.
  2. 1 2 Arkin, William M. (1998). "MASTERMINDING AN AIR WAR". Washington Post. Retrieved 2007-11-29.
  3. 1 2 On target: organizing and executing the strategic air campaign against Iraq. DIANE Publishing. p. 75. ISBN 1-4289-9024-0.
  4. ↑ Klare, Michael T. (1995). Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy. Hill & Wang. p. 57. ISBN 0-8090-1587-0.
  5. ↑ McFarland, Stephen L. (1997). A Concise History of the U.S. Air Force. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center. pp. 79. ISBN 0-16-049208-4.
  6. 1 2 Davis, Richard G., On Target: Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq, DIANE Publishing, 2002, p. 172-179
  7. 1 2 Knights, Michael, Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the Birth of Modern U.S. Military Power, Naval Institute Press, 2005, p. 25-27
  8. ↑ Davis, p. 77-79
  9. ↑ Davis, p. 105
  10. 1 2 Knights, p. 48-49
  11. ↑ Davis, p. 157-158
  12. ↑ Davis, p. 178
  13. ↑ Davis, p. 182-190
  14. ↑ Davis, p. 196
  15. ↑ Macgregor, Douglas A. (2003). Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights. Greenwood Press. p. 101. ISBN 0-275-98192-4.

References

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