Simpson v Attorney-General
| Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's case] | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court | Court of Appeal of New Zealand |
| Full case name | Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's case] |
| Decided | 29 July 1994 |
| Citation(s) | [1994] 3 NZLR 667 |
| Transcript(s) | http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/1993/350.pdf |
| Court membership | |
| Judge(s) sitting |
Cooke P, McMullin J, Casey J, Hardie Boys, Gault , Mackay J |
| Keywords | |
| Negligence, Search and Seizure, New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Damages | |
Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent's case] [1994] 3 NZLR 667 is a leading case in New Zealand regarding the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, that upheld damages against the police for an unreasonable search.[1]
The case involved police who had been legally issued a search warrant relating to a drug bust but executed the warrant at the wrong address. Despite knowing the address was incorrect, the police continued to search the property. The family of the person who had been wrongfully searched sued the Crown arguing breaches of section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. Previously, no case had awarded damages for breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and there was no mention of damages in the legislation itself. The Crown argued that they had immunity from prosecution or alternatively that if they did not have immunity, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy other than a declaration of incompliance with the Bill of Rights. The Court of Appeal felt that a mere declaration would be "toothless" and subsequently awarded damages.
The decision is significant for multiple reasons. It allows plaintiffs to initiate a cause of action for breaches of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, a previously unavailable remedy. Where a plaintiff has an existing cause of action but feels the remedy is insufficient, they are also able to sue under this ground additionally.
The case was criticised as representing an example of judicial activism, and that Parliament did not intend to offer financial compensation for breaches of the act. This was particularly true because in New Zealand, the act is not entrenched nor does it achieve the status of "Supreme Law" like similar nations have in their constitutions. However, following the decision, the Law Commission advised Parliament not to overrule the decision, which Parliament ultimately followed.
In Attorney General v Chapman, in a split decision, the Supreme Court restricted the application of damages to only acts done by the executive or legislative branches, thereby excluding damages for breaches by the judiciary.[2]
References
- ↑ McLay, Geoff (2003). Butterworths Student Companion Torts (4th ed.). LexisNexis. ISBN 0-408-71686-X.
- ↑ http://nzhumanrightsblog.com/newzealand/case-note-on-simpson-v-attorney-general-baigents-case/