Pro-Beijing camp

For Macau, see Pro-establishment camp.
Pro-Beijing camp
Convenor Martin Liao
Founded Early 1990s
Ideology Chinese nationalism
Conservatism (HK)
Conservative socialism
Economic liberalism[1]
Authoritarianism
Political position Centre-right
Legislative Council
40 / 70
District Councils
326 / 458
Pro-Beijing camp
Traditional Chinese 親北京派
Pro-China camp
Traditional Chinese 親中派
Pro-establishment camp
Traditional Chinese 建制派
Politics and government
of Hong Kong
Foreign relations

Related topics

Hong Kong portal

Pro-Beijing camp, pro-China camp or pro-establishment camp (Chinese: 親北京派, 親中派 or 建制派[2][3]) is a political alignment in Hong Kong which generally supports the policies and views of the Communist-governed People's Republic of China before and after the handover of Hong Kong, as well as the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region since 1997. It is also portrayed as the "Patriotic Front" (slogan: "Love the Country and Love Hong Kong") by the pro-Beijing media. Members of the camp are also labelled "Beijing loyalists" (保皇黨, literally "protecting the emperor party").

The pro-Beijing camp's origins can be found in the pro-Communist, or "leftist", activism in Hong Kong under British colonial rule. Many of its members were involved in the Hong Kong 1967 Leftist Riots and boycotts against the colonial government, standing in opposition to Nationalists. After the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in 1984, affirming Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong from 1997, many with pro-Beijing sentiments were appointed by the Beijing government to various mainland institutions. Paradoxically, the pro-Beijing camp realigned itself with the conservative pro-business elite as a "United Front" to counter pan-democracy camp.

Today, it has become the main force in support of the SAR government and consists of sectors with various views and interests but claiming to share the values of patriotism, social stability and economic prosperity and, fundamentally, PRC rule in Hong Kong.

Ideology

The pro-Beijing camp members are united by the political ideology of being closer to Beijing government, as much out of pragmatism as of conviction, but vary on other issues within the context of Hong Kong. Even amongst pragmatists there are differing reasons for that pragmatism, some see the financial and business benefits that come from closer ties with Beijing, others hope that in conceding on those issues which China will not compromise on, to be able preserve as much in the way of personal liberties and local autonomy as can be achieved. The rhetoric of the pro-Beijing camp is mostly concerned with patriotism, social stability and economic prosperity. Some oppose increased democratic development in Hong Kong with the introduction of universal suffrage and see in it the creation of instability, and the opportunity of foreign influence in local affairs by the United States.

History

Prior to handover

Some of the political groups within the pro-Beijing camp, such as the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) and some members in the current Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) have had a history of following the directions of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and of loyalty to the Communist Party of China (CPC) since the colonial period. They have been called pro-Communists, Communist sympathisers and "Leftists". During the post-war period, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and the Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association. Their rivals were the pro-Nationalist camp, who pledged allegiance to the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Some of the pro-Communists formerly participated in the Hong Kong 1967 Leftist Riots against colonial rule. The Leftists lost their prestige after the riots for a period of time as the general public was against the violence attributed to the Leftists.

After the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, Beijing appointed Hong Kong tycoons and professionals to the Hong Kong Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC) and the Hong Kong Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) as the means of forming a united front. A group of businesspeople and elites tried to influence the politics of the formation of the Hong Kong Government after 1997. The Business and Professional Group of the Basic Law Consultative Committee was formed in April 1986, later known as the Group of 89, and proposed a conservative, undemocratic method for electing the Chief Executive and Legislative Council in contrast to the more progressive proposal of the liberal-minded members of the Consultative Committee.[4] Several new political parties, including the Liberal Democratic Federation of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance were formed on the basis of the elite group.

The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 sparked pro-democracy sentiments in Hong Kong. The newly formed democratic party, the United Democrats of Hong Kong, enjoyed landslide victories in the District Boards election, Urban and Regional Council election and Legislative Council election in 1991. Countering the democratic forces, the British-appointed unofficial members of the Legislative Council launched a pro-business conservative Liberal Party, and the traditional leftists formed the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong.

The large-scale democratisation initiated by then Governor Chris Patten resulted in the deterioration of Sino-British relations and led to the emergence of an "unholy alliance" of pro-Beijing businesspeople and leftist loyalists versus the pro-democratic popular alliance.[5] Despite this, in the broadened franchise, the pro-Beijing camp was again defeated by the pro-democracy camp in the 1995 Legislative Council election.

The PRC government argued that the electoral reform introduced by Patten had violated the Joint Declaration, and thus they would scrap the reforms upon resumption of sovereignty. In preparation, a parallel legislature, the Provisional Legislative Council, was set up in 1996 under the control of the Pro-Beijing camp, and it introduced as the Legislative Council upon the founding of the new SAR government in 1997.

Post-1997

Since 1997, more new political groups have been formed. With their support within the functional constituencies, the pro-Beijing camp has never lost a majority in LegCo, controlling LegCo through a collaboration of the DAB and the Liberal Party. On 1 July 2003, a peaceful crowd of 500,000 protested[6] against the introduction of controversial legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law. James Tien, the leader of the Liberal Party and member of the Executive Council, forced the government to delay the second reading of the bill. The stance of the DAB on Article 23 was strongly criticised and led to their losses in the Hong Kong district councils election, 2003.

After the setbacks in 2003, the pro-Beijing camp won back seats lost in 2003 in the Hong Kong district councils election, 2007 and enjoyed another victory in Hong Kong district councils election, 2011. In the Hong Kong legislative election, 2012, the pro-Beijing camp managed to win more than half of the geographical constituency seats respectively in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon West and New Territories West, narrowing the number of seats held in the geographical constituencies between pro-Beijing and pro-democrats to 17 seats and 18 seats respectively. The pro-Beijing camp retained control of the Legislative Council and the DAB remained the largest party with 13 seats in total.

In recent years, the pro-Beijing camp has expanded its spectrum of support from pro-business elites and traditional leftists to those from a broader background. The former Secretary for Security Regina Ip, who was in charge of introducing the Basic Law Article 23 stood in the Hong Kong Island by-election in 2007 against the former Chief Secretary Anson Chan supported by the pro-democrats. Despite her defeat, she was able to be elected in the 2008 Legislative Council election, and formed the middle class and professional oriented New People's Party in 2011.

Two pro-Beijing candidates ran for the Chief Executive election in 2012, with the Chief Secretary Henry Tang and the Convenor of the Executive Council, Leung Chun-ying. Leung eventually won the election with the support of the Central Government Liaison Office. The election divided the pro-Beijing camp into a Tang camp and a Leung camp. After the election, Beijing called for a reconciliation of the two camps.

Political parties

Advocacy groups

Following the election of CY Leung as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, public discontent manifested itself in the form of mass petitions, rallies and demonstrations, so much so that it seemed that a plurality of the Hong Kong public was anti-Leung. In late 2012 pro-Leung advocacy groups began to emerge such as Voice of Loving Hong Kong, Caring Hong Kong Power and Hong Kong Youth Care Association Limited, the fact that all these groups feature the Chinese character for love in the names has led to these groups to be called the "love Hong Kong faction" (Chinese: 愛字派 literally "love character faction"). The word love in this context is taken from the lexicon of political debate in mainland China, were the slogan "Love China, Love the Party", is seen as the basis of patriotism, and the demand that any future Chief Executive of Hong Kong must "Love China, Love Hong Kong"(Chinese: 愛國愛港).

These supposedly grassroots organisations present themselves as being a spontaneous reaction to the excesses of the pan-democracy camp, as Hong Kong's silent majority who wish for a prosperous, harmonious society and who reject the "social violence" of the pan-democrats. Describing themselves as apolitical and independent of outside powers, these groups use various tactics to counter the pan-democrats, including counter rallies and marches in opposition to pan-democrat ones, counter petitions, and making accusations of campaign fund fraud and irregularities against pan-democrat politicians to the Independent Commission Against Corruption.[7] They also make use of mass heckling at pan-democracy forums to silence debate.[8]

Outside commentators suspect that these groups are orchestrated by China's Liaison Office in Hong Kong pointing to a use of language that parrots Beijing's and an illogical antipathy to Falun Gong which mirrors Beijing's own bugbear. Whether directly or not these organisations have received support from Beijing through the United Front Work Department, with employees of Chinese companies based in Hong Kong, being asked to sign petitions and attend rallies, and members of hometown societies being paid to do the same.[9]

During the 2014 Hong Kong protests, on mid-October 2014, the "love Hong Kong faction" took to wearing a blue ribbon as a counter to the protesters yellow one. It is alleged that it is the "love Hong Kong faction" that has organised counter protests and who attempted to charge through pan-democracy protesters in Causeway Bay.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Ma, Ngok (2007). Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society. Hong Kong University Press. p. 41.
  2. ↑ Apple Daily HK: LegCo 2016
  3. ↑ Apple Daily HK: Talk about weather; pan and pro
  4. ↑ Loh, Christine (2010). Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press. pp. 160–164.
  5. ↑ Chan, Ming K. (1997). The Challenge of the Reintegration with China. Hong Kong University Press. p. 51.
  6. ↑ South China Morning Post, 2 July 2003
  7. ↑ "Group files donation complaint to ICAC". RTHK. 24 July 2014. Retrieved 17 December 2014.
  8. ↑ "Hecklers disrupt democracy forum". RTHK. 7 April 2014. Retrieved 6 October 2014.
  9. ↑ Torode, Greg; Pomfret, james; Lim, Benjamin (4 July 2014). "The battle for Hong Kong's soul". Taipei Times. Retrieved 9 October 2014.
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